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RESPONDENTS' AND CROSS APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to determine whether plaintiffs are 
partners in the Salt Lake Transfer Company, or are co-
owners, but not partners; to determine whether they have 
made a valid contract to sell their interests to defendants 
and, if they have made such a contract, to determine 
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whether plaintiffs' interests were sold in 1932 for 1932 
values or in 1960 for 1960 values; and, if partnership be 
found, to obtain an order of partnership accounting and 
winding up, or, if sale be found, to determine the sales 
price as of the applicable date. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
The trial of the case was divided into two phases, lia-
bility and damages. The court held that plaintiffs were 
co-owners, but not partners, that they had made a con-
tract (Ex. P-B) in 1932 which was not void for fraud, 
mistake or undue influence, that the contract permitted 
either party to terminate the co-ownership by notice to 
the other, that neither did terminate that co-ownership 
until 1960 when defendants tendered plaintiffs an insuffi-
cient amount for their share of the business and plaintiffs 
refused the tender and brought this action. The court, in 
the trial of the damages issues, found the value of plain-
tiffs' share of the company and undistributed profits, 
including interest from the sale date to judgment, to be 
$229,842.07, of which $48,000 has been paid by defendants, 
leaving $181,842.07 still due. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a determination affirming the trial 
court's Judgments, or, in the alternative, if the Findings 
and Judgments are to be reversed, a reversal directing 
the trial court to find that plaintiffs and defendants are 
partners, that the partners are the equitable owners of 
the real estate defendants transferred out of Salt Lake 
Transfer Company into their own corporation, Sims 
Realty Company, and that an accounting and winding up 
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of the aftairs of said partnership be had. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with some of appellants' Statement 
of Facts, disagree with some, and claim that additional 
facts must be considered to permit a correct determination 
of the appeal. Appellants' Statement of Facts is replete 
with argument, all of which argument respondents con-
trovert. For example, appellants state that the two 
brothers, George and Milton carried on their business 
from 1932 to 1959. The facts show and the trial court 
found that the two brothers managed the business owned 
by plaintiffs and defendants from 1932 to 1959 and after 
Milt's death in 1959 it was carried on for all of the parties 
hereto until June 30, 1960. 
On page 6 of their brief appellants state that George 
and Gladys did in fact execute a valuation of the assets 
under the 1932 agreement and that Exs. D-H and D-I 
were executed by Gladys (plaintiff) based on values 
known to her. The trial court found to the contrary, that 
there had never been a proper or binding valuation under 
either Ex. P-A or P-B (R. 111, Finding No. 7). That this 
finding is abundantly supported by the evidence is shown 
hereafter in Point VII of the Argument. 
Appellants state the Bill of Sale (Ex. P-A) to have been 
executed at a time "when money was not readily avail-
able to pay for the interests of the brothers and sisters." 
The record is wholly silent on the availability of money to 
George and Milton in 1932 except for such information as 
can be derived from Ex. D-I which showed that George 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
and Milton each had an unencumbered interest of 
$18,587.17 in a business whose only debt was $2,266.35 of 
current accounts payable, and that they also had 1/9 of 
their father's interest, worth not less than $3,614.00, mak-
ing an aggregate ownership of not less than $44,402.34, 
almost all in liquid assets. If the true value of the business 
in 1932 was $95,000 as George indicates in Ex. D-C, 
George and Milton were just that much ($5,623.54 for 
their share) better off in terms of cash and borrowing 
power. Under the trial court's decision for the plaintiffs, 
and the evidence that George and Milton were worth 
some $50,000 in the depths of the Depression, it could be 
inferred that defendants did not want to buy in 1932, 
rather than that they were unable to buy. 
Appellant states that the 1932 agreement was a with-
drawal by plaintiffs from the partnership. The court 
found otherwise (R. 110, Finding No. 5). 
At page 9, in discussing the meeting of the parties in 
1959, appellants state that the parties agreed that $18,000 
was "a fair price" for plaintiffs' interests. No testimony is 
cited to that effect and none is in the record. Defendants 
themselves objected to the admission in evidence of the 
amount offered by George to his brothers and sisters on 
the ground that it was irrelevant, and it was only permit-
ted in the record at all after stipulation that it had no 
probative effect as to value (R. 186). The record does 
show that $18,000 each would have been acceptable to the 
plaintiffs then present, but none had made any examina-
tion as to the true value of his interest. 
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On page 10, appellants state that John Sims "agreed 
upon a valuation of $10,000.00 for his 1f27th interest." 
They cite R. 757 as proof, and neglect to state that, after 
objection, they withdrew the question now cited as proof 
( R. 758). The only evidence actually in the record regard-
ing John Sims' settlement with the defendants is at R. 
769, where John is cited by George as saying he was 
hard up and needed money and would take $10,000.00 
cash for his interest. This cannot be seriously urged as 
probative of value. So far as the record shows John never 
got closer to the company books than Las Vegas, where 
the above settlement took place (R. 769). 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
George A. Sims is the oldest of the nine brothers and 
sisters who are the plaintiffs and principal defendants in 
this action, Milton K. Sims, now deceased, is the next 
younger, the six plaintiff brothers and sisters are next 
younger and John Sims is the youngest. In 1932 John 
Sims was a minor and all of the others had reached their 
majority. Each of the plaintiffs testified that their family 
was close knit and harmonious, full of love and affection, 
that they loved and trusted George, that George, as the 
eldest brother was the family leader (R. 164), the "guide-
post" of the family (R. 135) , and that they relied upon 
him in 1932 when Ex. P-B was executed, as well as before 
and since that time. Each plaintiff testified to the same 
effect: Mrs. McDonald (R. 135-6 and R. 142), Mrs. Hanni-
bal (R. 162-4), Mr. Cleveland Sims (R. 194 and 196), Mr. 
Louis Sims (R. 203 and 205), Mrs. Malquist (R. 214 and 
216), and Mrs. Bullough (R. 222-3). The defendant, 
George A. Sims, characterized his relationship to the 
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plaintiffs as follows (R. 314-5) : 
"Q Mr. Sims, I think the testimony here shows 
that you are the eldest of the nine children? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And when you started to work in the business 
some of the children were still very small, they were 
babies, were they not? 
A Well, I started when I was 21, in the fall of '21, 
and the babies came along about every two years. 
Q You mean yours or your father's? 
A No. I didn't get married at that time. 
Q In other words, some of your younger brothers 
and sisters are about 20 years young than yourself, 
are they not? 
A I would imagine that's about right. 
Q Now, in 1904, I believe, your father went to 
Europe on a mission? 
A It was about that time. 
Q And when he went on a mission he was gone 
how long? 
A About two years. 
Q And you stepped in and took charge of the busi-
ness at that time? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you were living home with all your broth-
ers and sisters? 
A Until I got married. 
Q And the testimony here showed that they 
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looked up to you as the elder brother and relied on 
you and loved you, would you say that's correct? 
A I'd say that was right. 
Q And during all the balance of your life and 
their lives, right up to the present time that has been 
pretty much the case, you have been the older 
brother looked up to? 
A I would say they have, always. 
Q And that was true in 1932 also, was it not, Mr. 
Sims? 
A Yes, sir." 
The trial court found that, at the time Ex. P-B was 
executed, the older George occupied a fiduciary position 
with relation to the plaintiffs (R. 110, Finding No. 3). 
At the time of his last illness George H. Sims, who was 
the founder of the Salt Lake Transfer Company and the 
father of the nine persons referred to above, owned 60% 
of the Salt Lake Transfer Company and was entitled to 
one-third of its profits. The remaining portion of the Salt 
Lake Transfer Company was owned by the two eldest 
sons, George and Milton, each of whom owned 207o and 
each of whom was, under their partnership agreement 
with their father, entitled to one-third of the profits. 
Two days before his death, and at a time when he was 
so ill he could not sign his name, indicating his signature 
by a feeble "x," George H. Sims (the father) transferred 
his interest in the Salt Lake Transfer Company to his 
nine children in equal undivided shares (Ex. P-A). 
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On April 4, 1932 George H. Sims (the father) passed 
away. All of his children were in Salt Lake and the plain-
tiffs testified that they were grief stricken. The daughters 
particularly testified as to their love for their father and 
as to the depth and completeness of their mourning and 
grief both at the time of his death and of his burial two 
days later (R. 141, 165, 205, 216 and 224). One daughter 
said the day of the funeral, April 6, 1932, "was about as 
sad a day as you could imagine" (R. 216), and another 
said she was in a state of shock and had to be helped 
(R.165). 
George and Milton were not so grieved as to distract 
their minds from business. They had their attorney, Irwin 
Clawson, draw for them the document which is Ex. P-B 
and it was in George's hands, ready for presentation as 
soon as their father was interred. According to the unani-
mous testimony of the six plaintiffs and without any 
contradictory testimony from any other source, George 
presented this document to his younger brothers and sis-
ters almost immediately after they returned to the family 
home from the cemetery on the day of the funeral (R. 
140-143, 165-7, 194-6, 204-5, 215-17, and 225-6). Other 
relatives and friends had come to the house and Gladys 
Bullough, among others, was occupied trying to see that 
they were fed and cared for. At this time George A. Sims 
(defendant) said he wanted to talk with his brothers and 
sisters, and called them into the front parlor, particularly 
excluding their husbands and wives, closed the doors 
dividing the parlor from the rest of the house and pre-
sented the 1932 agreement, Ex. P-B, for signature. He 
stated, according to the unimpeached and uncontradicted 
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testimony of the six plaintiffs, that the document had to 
be signed so that he could be assured of the management 
of the family business. His statements in this regard were 
variously reported: 
Winifred McDonald (R. 141) "He said we were to sign 
it so that he and Milt would take charge of the business 
for all of us with no interference." and (R. 143) "He was 
just going to take care of the business for us." 
Inna Hannibal (R. 166-7) "And George said, 'Well, 
this is so that the business will go on just as it has been 
going on. This is so that Milt and I can go on managing 
the business.' " 
Louis Sims (R. 205) "And then he had an agreement, I 
think, to run the business and he asked us to sign it. And 
I think the statement he made was so we wouldn't be 
bothered about the running of the business, and so we all 
signed it." 
Grace Malquist (R. 218) "George told us that it was 
very urgent and I imagine that's why he did it the same 
day. He said it was very urgent. I don't know why, but he 
said it was very urgent to form a new partnership imme-
diately because of my father's death. He said, 'And I have 
to have this signed to continue to operate the transfer 
company.' And he said, 'I want this signed,' and he said, 
'I don't want any interference from the management of it 
with the other members of the family,' which is perfectly 
reasonable." 
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The defendant George Sims himself says of the occa-
sion, in reply to a question by Mr. Pugsley as to whether 
he made any declarations to his brothers and sisters, or 
required them to sign the 1932 agreement (R. 309): "I 
can't remember. It was something there, but I can't re-
member that." 
There was no long perusal or any discussion of the 
meaning of the agreement, nor any argument by the 
grief-stricken younger brothers and sisters. Each of them 
testified that he relied on George's honor, fairness, leader-
ship and love and signed the document. One or two 
thought they saw copies of the contract, others had never 
read it. 
Each of the plaintiffs testified that they never chal-
lenged the right of George to exercise the management of 
Salt Lake Transfer Company without interference from 
them, that they understood they had, as represented on 
the day of their father's death, given the right to control 
the operation of their company to their beloved elder 
brothers, and that they had never sought to interfere in 
the management since that date, although they had al-
ways considered themselves as owners and partners, hav-
ing each received a patrimony of one-ninth from their 
father. Each year they received an accounting of the 
profits, showing them listed among the owners. 
Copies of all partnership returns filed by the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company from the time of the death of the 
parent of the parties hereto until the year 1960 are in 
evidence (Exs. P-J and P-K). In the Federal return for 
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the year 1932 (P-J) the defendant, George A. Sims, re-
ferred to himself as a "Trustee" for the one-third interest 
owned by the nine children. In the appropriate portion of 
the 1933 income tax returns, he referred to the nine 
children as being "partners or members" calling all nine 
(including himself and Milton) owners of "Misc. Minor 
Interest." In 1934 he showed the plaintiffs as partners and 
again referred to them as "Misc. Minor Interests." In 1935 
he again indicated the participation of his brothers and 
sisters in the proprietary portion of both income tax re-
turns referring to them in Utah return as "Misc. (Inter-
ests)" and in the Federal return as "Miscellaneous (In-
terest)." In 1936 he showed the partners or members as 
being George A. Sims, M. K. Sims and, on the Federal 
return ''Interest credited to miscellaneous members" and 
on the State return "Miscellaneous (Interest on Invest-
ment)." In 1937 and 1938 George A. and Milton K. Sims 
showed themselves as the only persons listed as owners 
(partners) in the appropriate place in the schedules. In 
1939 on the Federal return in Schedule "J" "Partners 
Share of Income and Credits" George and Milton listed 
all of the plaintiff brothers and sisters as well as them-
selves as being owners and showed the amount of or-
dinary net income and the distribution of charitable con-
tributions among the owners. In 1940 George and Milton 
showed in Schedule "J" that they and the seven brothers 
and sisters were the partners. Losses on the sale of stock 
WeTe distributed to the owners, including the six plain-
tiffs herein, pro rata and charitable deductions were 
distributed to the owners pro rata, each according to the 
amount of his interest. Each year thereafter until the 
commencement of this suit, all of the plaintiffs were 
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shown as partners on the income tax returns and were 
treated as owners for the purpose of distributing divi-
dends and any other items which, under the tax law, 
have a separate tax effect on owners and are accounted 
separately from partnership net profit. 
The last income tax return filed by defendants prior to 
this litigation was prepared by defendants' accountants 
on March 23, 1960 and is for the year 1959. Each of the 
plaintiffs is listed on the returns for that year as a partner. 
On June 3, 1960 this suit was filed and thereafter de-
fendants ceased to list plaintiffs on the tax returns as 
partners. 
It is to be noted that each of these returns, beginning 
with the 1932 return which was prepared in 1933 after the 
death of the father of the parties, was wholly prepared by 
the defendants, without any consultation with plaintiffs. 
The record is clear that none of the plaintiffs interfered 
with the management of the company by defendants after 
agreeing on April 6, 1932 that they would not do so. 
Each year from 1932 to 1960 the plaintiffs were advised 
by defendants what the profit or loss had been, and in the 
years 1939 and 1940 defendants sent plaintiffs copies of 
the profit and loss statement and operating statement, in 
each instance showing them as partners. Some of the 
letters showing the distribution of profit have been lost, 
but the copies of the 1939 and 1940 profit and loss state-
ments and of the letters showing partnership profit distri-
bution from 1942 through 1958 are in evidence aggre-
gately marked Ex. P-E. In the years 1946, 1950, and 1951 
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the document was entitled "Distributions of Partnership 
Profits for Year" and in the other years the reference was 
to 11Salt Lake Transfer Company Profits." 
According to the income tax returns (Ex. P-J and P-K) 
Robert B. Sims and Elmer L. Sims, sons of Milton K. 
Sims, were shown as partners for the first time in 1942 
and their names were placed on the bottom of the list of 
partners after the plaintiffs' names. This same order of 
listing continued through 1945. In 1946 G. Grant Sims 
was added at the end of the list of partners on the returns 
and on the list of owners and distribution of income sent 
out to each of the plaintiffs (Ex. P-E, pages 12 and 13). In 
1947 Elmer L. Sims and G. Grant Sims moved themselves 
up the list of partners and were listed next after Milton K. 
Sims and George A. Sims, with the plaintiffs listed after 
them and the partner R. B. Sims listed last. This method 
of listing continued except that in 1948 the partner R. B. 
Sims was changed to Mrs. R. B. Sims (later called Mrs. 
T. H. Mazuran), she being substituted in his place because 
of his death. Mrs. Sims (Mazuran) is described by the 
defendant, Elmer Sims, as owning and exercising all of 
the incidents of partnership except that she doesn't par-
ticipate in management (R. 299). 
At the time of the death of George H. Sims (the father) 
the partnership owned Kennecott Copper Company, Ana-
conda Copper Company, Utah Power and Light and 
Z.C.M.I. stock. The dividends from this stock were regu-
larly shown in the partnership income tax return (Ex. 
P-J and P-K). In 1940 the Anaconda and Kennecott 
stocks, which had been purchased in 1929 (Ex. D~F) and 
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had a high basis were sold at a loss and the loss was dis-
tributed to the partners (Ex. P-E and page 3 of the 1940 
Federal income tax return in Ex. P-J). In June, 1946 the 
Utah Power and Light Company stock of the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company was distributed to the owners of that 
company. Each of the plaintiffs received 23 shares and 
the capital account of each plaintiff was charged with the 
cost of that stock on the books of the company, to-wit, 
$275.31 (Ex. P-E, page 20). 
On March 29, 1952 Elmer L. Sims wrote to each of the 
plaintiffs and a copy of the letter is in evidence (Ex. P-E, 
Page 20). In that letter he advised Mr. Malquist (the 
husband of the plaintiff, Grace Malquist, and the one who 
kept track of her interest in the Salt Lake Transfer 
Company for her) that an adjustment had been made on 
the depreciation schedule in the course of an audit. In 
that letter he made the following statement: "According 
to their audit the amounts of $773.09 for 1949 and 
$2,278.27 for 1950 is correct, and these adjustments had 
been issued to all the partners." In the ensuing years the 
amount of the adjustment as it relates to each of the 
plaintiffs is shown in the report of profits made to them 
(Ex. P-E, Pages 21 et seq.). 
Each of the plaintiffs testified that he or she understood 
that his position with regard to the Salt Lake Transfer 
Company was that of part owner and a partner after 
April 6, 1932, but that he had agreed not to interfere with 
George and Milt's management of the jointly owned 
family business. The testimony of the plaintiff, Winifred 
McDonald, in that respect is typical (R. 145) : 
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"Q (By Mr. Tanner) I asked you, Mrs. McDonald-
1'11 repeat the question. Did you have an understand-
ing on April 6, 1932 and subsequent thereto as to 
whether or not you were a partner in the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company? Now, you may answer that yes 
or no. 
A Yes. I was part owner and a partner as near as 
I know without any interference. 
Q Is that your understanding? 
A Absolutely." 
There was no contrary testimony by any party to the 
April 6, 1932 agreement. 
Plaintiff, Mrs. McDonald, testified that in 1954, de-
fendant, George Sims, then managing head of the Salt 
Lake Transfer Company, had a conference with her and 
Claron Spencer at the Zions First National Bank in which 
George Sims stated that Mrs. McDonald then owned a 
share of the Salt Lake Transfer Company, which share he 
estimated to be then worth $18,000.00 (R. 147 to 150). 
This was not denied by George Sims. 
Plaintiff, Louis Sims, testified that in 1956 defendant, 
1~ George Sims, offered to buy Louis Sims' interest in the 
Salt Lake Transfer Company for $16,000.00, but that when 
he (Louis) offered to buy George's share on the same 
~t basis, George refused and no deal was made (R. 207-8). 
!it He further testified that again, in 1959, George offered to 
!r buy the interest of each family member for $18,000.00 
~1; apiece, but later withdrew the offer (R. 208-9). This was 
~- never denied by George Sims. Grant Malquist, the hus-
t· band of one of the plaintiffs, was present on the 1959 
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occasion and states that, after a discussion of the necessity 
for new arrangements among the brothers and sisters 
because of the effect of Milt's death on their partnership, 
George said that the boys (defendants Elmer and Grant) 
were not content to go on with the arrangement that had 
been in effect for many, many years (R. 185). He then de-
scribes what occurred as follows (R. 187): 
"A He said he would offer each family member 
who happened to be in the partnership an amount of 
$18,000 in stock and that he would use the current 
quoted price of the stock as shown in the newspaper 
on that date and that was entirely satisfactory to the 
members present. We inquired that that offer be also 
made to the other partners and he indicated it would. 
And with that he said, 'If you wish, I'll go down to 
the bank and get the stocks right now.' So I offered to 
drive him down and we drove to a bank, I don't' re-
member the name of it. It was on 2nd South between 
Main and State. But it was late in the afternoon when 
we arrived there. The bank was closed. George 
came out and told me that and we drove back to the 
house. And he said, 'We'll renew this tomorrow 
morning.' Do you wish me to go on? 
Q Yes, continue to say what he said or did. 
A The following morning he called me on the 
telephone at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. David H. 
Bullough and said, 'Grant, the deal is off.' He said, 'I 
had a meeting last night with my sons and our attor-
ney,' and he said, 'the deal is off.' 
Q So the transaction was not consummated? 
A It was not consummated." 
Defendant Elmer Sims testified that $27,000.00 of the 
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accumulated profits belonging to plaintiffs were kept in 
the Salt Lake Transfer Company as working capital 
(R. 295). 
Defendant, George Sims, testified regarding the owner-
ship of the Salt Lake Transfer Company as follows (R. 
316): 
"Q Actually the transfer company was considered 
being owned one-third by you, one-third by Milt, 
then one-third by all nine of you as brothers and 
sisters? 
A Yes." 
ARGUMENT 
GENERAL 
All the issues of liability revolve around the answers to 
these questions: Is Ex. P-B a valid agreement? If so, what 
is its proper interpretation in light of its terms, the condi-
tions as they existed, and the conduct of its parties at the 
time of its execution and thereafter? Among other things, 
the answer to these questions is dispositive of whether the 
defendants' transfer to themselves of all of the realty of 
the Salt Lake Transfer Company was wrongful, and 
whether they must put it, or its equivalent in money, back 
into the communal pot. 
It is plaintiffs' contention that the relationship of trust 
and confidence found to exist between the defendants 
George and Milton Sims and the plaintiffs is significant in 
two principal aspects, first, as it relates the state of the 
burden of proof on the question of whether the 1932 
agreement is void for fraud, and whether it was carried, 
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and, second, if the agreement is not void, as it relates to 
the question of how its terms should be interpreted, the 
fiduciary having been the scrivener. 
It is the plaintiffs' contention that the evidence of part-
nership recited in the Statement of Facts also has dual 
significance, first, as it relates to the disputed finding 
(against the plaintiffs) that no partnership existed be-
tween the parties after April 6, 1932, and, second, as it 
relates to defendants' contention (the trial court found to 
the contrary) that the only proper interpretation of the 
1932 agreement is that plaintiffs ceased to be owners of 
any portion of the Salt Lake Transfer Company in 1932, 
having consummated a sale and transfer of their patri-
mony to George and Milton on the sad day of their 
father's funeral. 
Plaintiffs further contend that defendants are on the 
horns of a dilemma. Either they must stand on the 1932 
contract (Ex. P-B) and claim a 1932 sale at 1932 prices, 
in which case the contract must be set aside for fraud, 
mistake or undue influence, or they must admit parol 
evidence to show that the contract actually was an option 
or contract to sell in future, rather than a 1932 sale, in 
which case the contract is valid, but the sales price is the 
value at the time the option or call was exercised, which 
is the 1960 price. In either event, defendants lose. This is 
developed more extensively in Point I hereafter. 
The argument in this brief will be directed first to the 
points raised by plaintiffs in their cross-appeal and then 
to the points of the defendants' appeal. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
EXHIBIT P-B WAS NOT VOID OR UNENFORCE-
ABLE ON THE GROUNDS OF FRAUD, MISTAKE OR 
UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
The trial court, both in the pretrial order (R. 89) and in 
the conduct of the case, held plaintiffs to the burden of 
proving fraud, mistake or undue influence by clear and 
convincing evidence. This misconceives both the burden 
of going forward and the quantum of proof in an action 
where the defendant occupies a fiduciary relationship to 
the plaintiffs. 
The rule is that, where the relation between the parties 
is one of trust and confidence, the courts of equity hold 
that it raises a presumption of undue influence and throws 
upon the dominant party the burden of establishing the 
fairness of the transaction and that it was the free act of 
the other party. 
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts states the rule 
as follows: 
"Sec. 497. Definition and Effect of Undue Influence. 
Where one party is under the domination of anoth-
er, or by virtue of the relation between them is justi-
fied in assuming that the other party will not act in a 
manner inconsistent with his welfare, a transaction 
induced by unfair persuasion of the latter, is induced 
by undue influence and voidable." 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. Vol. 5, Sec. 1625 at 
pages 4540 and 4541 says: 
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"* * *Undue influence, 'is not necessarily a fraudulent 
influence though it frequently is so .... It is a para-
mount influence, and when it is used for the benefit or 
advantage of him who exercises it for such a selfish 
purpose it may well be called 'fraudulent', and the 
law so regards it; but there may be cases where it is 
not actually fraudulent but in a moral sense innocent 
though not harmless.' But 'as far as the execution of 
instruments is concerned, the term fraud ordinarily 
suggests the idea of deception; whereas undue in-
fluence suggests the idea of coerced volition.' " * * * 
Thorne v. Reiser, 60 N.W. 2d 784, 245 Iowa 123, at page 
788: 
"The law concerning confidential relationships and 
their effect upon the transactions between parties to 
them is too well-settled to require much discussion. 
Not the law but the facts trouble the courts in such 
cases. * * * In the Sours case we pointed out that such 
relationship is not restricted to any special or par-
ticular form. There may be no legal or family rela-
tionship between the parties. The relationship never-
theless exists 'when one has gained the confidence of 
the other and purports to act or advise with the 
other's interest in mind.' Restatement of the Law of 
Trusts, section 2 (b); 37 C.J.S., Fraud (and other 
authorities). 
" * * * This does not mean there was anything wrong 
or fraudulent in the relationship itself or that there 
was any misrepresentation or undue influence exer-
cised by defendants. But the relationship, if shown to 
exist, casts upon the dominant party, before he can 
avail himself of any benefit growing out of the trans-
action between them, the burden of showing the con-
tract 'was fairly procured without undue influence or 
other circumstance tending to impeach its fairness', 
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Curtis v. Armagast, 158 Iowa 507, 138 N.W. 873, the 
burden of proving his compliance with equitable 
requisites." 
Sizemore v. Miller, 247 P. 2d 224; 196 Ore. 89: 
"• • • In arriving at the above conclusion, the trial 
court overlooked the principle of law, which is well-
established in this jurisdiction, that where a confi-
dential relationship exists between parties, when 
taken in connection with other suspicious circum-
stances, an inference of undue influence may be justi-
fied so as to require the beneficiary to proceed with 
the proof and present evidence sufficient to overcome 
the adverse inferences, and that slight evidence is 
sufficient to set aside an agreement between them on 
the ground of undue influence. Ingraham v. Struve, 
Or., 246 P. 2d 858; In re Southman's Estate, 178 Or. 
462, 168 P. 2d 572." (accent added.) 
Sparks v. Sparks, 225 P. 2d 238; 101 C.A. 2d 129: 
" * * * What constitutes undue influence and what 
constitutes sufficient proof thereof depend upon the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case. It 'is 
a species of constructive fraud which the courts will 
not undertake to define by any fixed principles, lest 
the very definition itself furnish a finger-board point-
ing out the path by which it may be evaded.' Long-
mire v. Kruger, 80 Cal. App. 230, 239, 251 P. 692, 696. 
There are certain relations from the existence of 
which the law will infer special confidence, not only 
those of husband and wife, parent and child, counsel 
and client, etc., but in numerous cases where the facts 
proved will warrant the inference. Bradley Co. v. 
Bradley, 37 Cal. App. 263, 267, 173 P. 1011. A confi-
dential relation in fact should be the test. Where a 
grantor has trust and confidence in the integrity and 
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fidelity of the grantee and the latter takes advantage 
of the grantor relief will be afforded. Steinberger v. 
Steinberger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116, 122, 140 P. 2d 31. 
One who holds a confidential relationship will be 
presumed to have taken undue advantage of his 
trusting friend unless it shall appear that the latter 
had independent advice and acted not only of his own 
volition but with full comprehension of the results of 
his action. Cox v. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 379, 156 P. 
509. 
"Persons standing in a confidential relation toward 
others will not be permitted to retain benefits which 
the others have conferred upon them unless they can 
show to the satisfaction of the court that the person 
by whom the benefits have been conferred were in-
dependently advised with reference to the transac-
tion. Burrows v. Burrows, 126 Cal. App. 323, 329, 28 
P. 2d 1072. No one who holds a confidential relation 
toward another will be permitted to take advantage 
of that relation in favor of himself or deal with the 
other terms of his own making. In every such trans-
action the law will presume that the person who held 
an influence over the other exercised it unduly to his 
own advantage. Khoury v. Barham, 85 Cal. App. 2d 
202, 212, 192 P. 2d 823. (accent added.) 
Perry v. McConkie, 1 Ut. 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852, at page 
854. 
"* * *Our conclusions are further justified when it is 
noted that, although fraud must be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence, we have adopted an excep-
tion to the principle in the case where, because of the 
kinship of the parties, a fiduciary relationship exists, 
as it does here, - requiring in such cases that the 
fiduciary assume the burden of proving that his deal-
ings with such beneficiary were fair and in good 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
faith. • • • " 
The facts to which the foregoing law must be applied 
are these. The trial court found (R. 110) as follows: 
"3. On April 6, 1932 at the time of the preparation 
and execution of said agreement, the said George A. 
Sims and Milton K. Sims occupied a position of trust 
and confidence with relation to plaintiffs." 
This finding is amply sustained by the evidence set forth 
in this brief in the Statement of Facts on pages 5 to 7. All 
of the parties to the 1932 agreement who testified, in-
cluding the defendant, George A. Sims, agreed that de-
fendants looked up to him as their elder brother, relied on 
him and loved him. Each of the plaintiffs testified that 
they relied on George's good faith, love and affection and 
trusted him when he said that the contract (Ex. P-B) 
was just so he and Milton could take care of the business 
for them all, the family, without having to worry about 
the others interfering with the management. George did 
not deny that he so represented, but, instead, affirmed 
that the others relied upon him (Statements of Facts, 
supra, pages 6 and 7). 
If this court were to hold that, by a strict fqur-corners 
construction of the April 6, 1932 agreement, George had, 
by using the trust and confidence of his unsuspecting 
brothers and sisters, succeeded in slipping their share of 
the business out from under them at depression prices, 
with no obligation to pay for it until some unascertained 
day in the future, with the sole and exclusive right to 
allocate earnings between capital investment and profits 
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(Ex. P-B, Par. 5) and with no obligation to pay for the 
use of their property unless he could make a profit with 
it, the court would be giving its blessings to an uncon-
scionable result. 
Sparks v. Sparks, supra, states that one who holds a 
confidential relationship will be presumed to have taken 
unfair advantage of his trusting friend (here they were 
brothers and sisters) unless it shall appear ( 1) that the 
latter had independent advice, (2) acted of his own voli-
tion, and ( 3) had a full comprehension of the results of 
his action. Thorne v. Reiser, supra, says he can only avail 
himself of benefit from the questioned transaction if he 
shows the contract to have been procured without undue 
influence or other circumstance tending to impeach its 
fairness, and Perry v. McConkie, supra (Utah case), says 
the fiduciary has the burden of proving that his dealings 
with the beneficiary were (1) fair and (2) in good faith. 
There was no word uttered, even by George himself, on 
the matter of the state of his and Milt's mind in 1932, that 
is, on their good faith. The timing of the contract to coin-
cide with the period of maximum grief and distraction, 
the deliberate exclusion of spouses, and the demanding 
insistence that the contract be signed then and there 
militates against good faith. These facts, combined with 
the shifted burden of proof and the silence of the defend-
ants require a determination that no good faith was 
shown. 
The Sparks v. Sparks standard gains defendants noth-
ing. Defendants ( 1) deliberately excluded plaintiffs from 
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independent advice, (2) deprived them of the exercise of 
their own volition by timing and by insistence on imme-
diate signing, and ( 3) by the statements that the business 
was to be "continued for us," and the subsequent conduct 
consonant with partnership and co-ownership, kept the 
beneficiaries from comprehending that anyone claimed 
they (plaintiffs) had already sold their inheritance. 
Did defendants sustain the other half of their burden 
under the Perry v. McConkie doctrine? Did they show the 
contract to be fair? All evidence on this point outside the 
two documents themselves (Ex. P-A and Ex. P-B) was 
objected to by defendants and admitted only over their 
objections. This evidence shows plaintiffs to have received 
substantial profits, to have been treated as co-owners, to 
have shared in the increased values of the Utah Power 
and Light stock held by the partnership, to have been 
charged with a share of the loss on the decreased value of 
the copper company stocks, and to be now offered 
$3,614.41 each for their share, plus some undistributed 
profits. If the plaintiffs were not deprived of their inheri-
tance in 1932, they would have received the same amount 
of profits and the stock, and $27,358.88 each for their 
share (R. 370-A, Finding 3). In other words, the trans-
action under examination is unfair in result if it did what 
defendants claim, and the only way it might be fair is if it 
is what plaintiffs claim it to be, a contract to sell upon 
demand at the price to be fixed when the demand is exer-
cised, that is, a contract to sell in 1960 at 1960 prices. 
Thus plaintiffs conclude that, under the evidence, either 
the contract is void because defendants failed to sustain 
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their burden of proving good faith, or, if defendants did 
prove good faith, the defendants have achieved a position 
astride the dilemma referred to. 
If the 1932 contract was not a contract of present sale at 
1932 prices but was, instead, a contract to sell at such 
future time as either party demanded, with all parties 
entitled to the full growth of their share and the increase 
in value of the assets it represented then it may be a fair 
contract. 
If, however, the contract was a 1932 sale, at 1932 prices, 
with the brothers and sisters to take the risk of leaving 
their money in the company, not even getting interest 
unless there was profit, sharing fully in the cost of pur-
chasing or developing land, trucks, other franchises and 
other assets, but not sharing in those assets thus acquired 
at plaintiffs' expense when they mature, develop or in-
crease in value, then the contract was unfair, over-
reaching, and fraudulent. 
Hence, if this court holds that no parol evidence or 
evidence of conduct can be used to explain, alter or mod-
ify the 1932 agreement, it necessarily follows that the 
court must then find that agreement to be void and un-
enforceable. The facts requiring this result are as follows: 
(a) Plaintiffs pleaded fraud, mistake or undue influ-
ence in their Statement of Contentions served prior to the 
December 12, 1961 pretrial conference (R. 85). This 
pleading was incorporated in the Pretrial Order of De-
cember 13, 1961 (R. 88-90). The plaintiffs objected in 
writing to the nature and extent of the burden the Pre-
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trial Order placed on them as to the fraud issue, stating 
that plaintiffs claimed a fiduciary relationship, with its 
resultant effect on the burden of proof (R. 91-2). The 
objection was served on defendants December 20, 1961. 
Two months later, February 19, 1962, this issue went to 
trial, with the claim of fraud, mistake or undue influence, 
and the claim of fiduciary relationship, clearly and timely 
pleaded. 
(b) At the trial, plaintiffs proved that the fiduciary re-
lationship existed. 
(c) Defendants adduced no evidence of any kind show-
ing that the contract was fair, just or equitable, other than 
the contract itself and proof of distribution of some of the 
profits over the years and reinvestment of some of the 
profits as working capital. 
(d) Unless the contract is fair, just and equitable on 
its face, defendants have failed to carry the fiduciary's 
burden of going forward with the proof and proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the contract is fair, 
just and equitable to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
(e) The defendants having thus failed, the contract 
must be held void because of the presumption against the 
fiduciary in his dealings with those as to whom he occu-
pies a fiduciary relationship. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS AND CERTAIN OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
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DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PARTNERS. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OR-
DER AN ACCOUNTING AND WINDING UP OF SAID 
PARTNERSHIP. 
Should the court have found that a partnership existed 
among the parties? 
If the 1932 agreement is held to be void, we must then 
look to the conduct of the parties to determine their re-
lationship. The pertinent conduct is as follows: 
(a) They were co-owners of the business. 
(b) They shared the profits in an agreed proportion. 
(c) They shared the losses when any occurred. 
(d) The plaintiffs had exercised their right to partici-
pate in the management by agreeing that George and 
Milton have sole management on their behalf. 
(e) Except for two years, the plaintiffs were, either 
individually or collectively, shown as partners on all Fed-
eral and State income tax returns filed by defendants 
between 1932 and 1960. 
(f) All shared in credit for charitable contributions 
made by Salt Lake Transfer Company as shown in the 
partnership returns, which credits are deductible only by 
co-owners. 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, codifying 
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sections 6 and 7 of the Uniform Partnership Act, relating 
to this point are: 
"48-1-3. 'Partnership' defined. -A partnership is an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit. * * * " 
"48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a part-
nership.- In determining whether a partnership ex-
ists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, persons 
who are not partners as to each other are not partners 
as to third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by 
entireties, joint property, common property, or part 
ownership, does not of itself establish a partnership, 
whether such co-owners do or do not share any 
profits made by the use of the property. 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself 
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons 
sharing them have a joint or common right or interest 
in any property from which the returns are derived. 
( 4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits 
of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a 
partner in the business, but no such inference shall be 
drawn if such profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
{c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of 
a deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of 
payment vary with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good 
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will of a business or other property by install-
ments or otherwise." 
Rowley on Partnership, 2nd Edition, Vol. 1, at pages 
103 and 104: 
"The requisites and essential elements of a partner-
ship are implicit in the definition. In an opinion of 
great force and clarity, Andrews, J. stated 'Partner-
ship results from contract, express or implied. If 
denied, it may be proved by the production of some 
written instrument, by testimony as to some conver-
sation, by circumstantial evidence. If nothing else 
appears, the receipt by the defendant of a share of the 
profits of the business is enough. * * * Assuming some 
written contract between the parties, the question 
may arise whether it creates a partnership. If it be 
complete, if it expresses in good faith the full under-
standing and obligation of the parties, then it is for 
the court to see whether a partnership exists. It may, 
however, be a mere sham intended to hide the real 
relationship. Then other results follow. In passing 
upon it, effect is to be given to each provision. Mere 
words will not blind us to realities. Statements that 
no partnership is intended are not conclusive. If on 
the whole, a contract contemplates an association of 
two or more persons to carry on, as co-owners a busi-
ness for profit, a partnership there is. * * * On the 
other hand, if it be less than this, no partnership 
exists.' " 
At pages 164 to 166: 
"Up until the year 1860 there was one test almost 
universally applied by which to determine the exist-
ence of a partnership. That test was: if the parties 
share in the profits of a business or transaction they 
are partners, at least as to third persons. It is now 
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recognized that although one shares in the profits of a 
business he is not necessarily a partner for that rea-
son alone. A general realization of the many excep-
tions which exist to the profit sharing test and its 
consequent untrustworthiness led to its modification. 
In its modified form the rule was often stated thus: 
'Two or more persons who contract together to carry 
on a business and share in the profits as common 
owners thereof are partners.' In other words, in order 
to constitute one a partner his right to share in the 
profits must result from the fact that he is a part 
owner of them. If the per cent of the profits due him 
is a mere personal obligation owed him by his asso-
ciate such person is not a partner. Regardless of the 
fact as to whether profit sharing, intention or other 
matters, are regarded as tests in any particular juris-
diction, all, perhaps, hold profit sharing to be an es-
sential element of partnership.* * *" (emphasis 
added) 
At page 170: 
"* * *'The salient features of an ordinary partner-
ship are ( 1) a community of interest in profits and 
losses, (2) a community of interest in the capital em-
ployed and (3) a community of power in administra-
tion. These are the primary tests and constitute the 
indicia of the existence of a partnership.' " 
At page 173: 
"E. CONTROL. 
The use of the test of control to determine the ex-
istence of a partnership is of recent origin, but has 
been of increasing use. As stated by the draftsmen of 
the Uniform Partnership Act 'To state that partners 
are co-owners of a business is to state that they each 
have the power of ultimate control.' The idea of con-
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trol as a test of partnership has been denominated as 
the 'principal trader test' and thus expressed by one 
writer: 'The ultimate inquiry in all cases is whether 
the party claimed to be a partner has become by 
agreement a principal trader in the business with 
another. In other words, has he a right to participate 
as principal trader in the management of the busi-
ness? If he has, he is a partner. If he has not, he is not 
a partner, with a single exception, which, however, is 
rather apparent than real. The exception is this: A 
person may be a partner, even though he has by ex-
press agreement entrusted the control of the business 
exclusively to his associates in the business. The 
question, strictly speaking, is not whether the party 
has a right to control the business as principal trader 
in the particular case, but whether he would have 
such right in that case by virtue of the agreement be-
tween himself and another, in the absence of any ex-
press provision conferring that right upon his associ-
ate in the business. If it appears that he would have 
had such right had it not been for his agreement to 
the contrary, then he is a partner, and his agreement 
merely operates as a surrender to his associate of a 
right which he would otherwise have enjoyed. * * * " 
(Emphasis added.) 
At pages 176 to 177: 
"F. SHARING OF LOSSES. 
* * * Where other essential elements of the part-
nership relation - such as the sharing of profits, co-
ownership of the business and the right of control-
are present, the duty to share losses is ordinarily im-
plied unless there is an agreement to the contrary. 
The parties need not agree to share losses, and it is 
usually sufficient that they enter into a relation with 
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an idea of profit under an agreement that there is to 
be a community of interest in the profits as such. An 
agreement providing merely for a division of profits 
and not of losses may be a partnership agreement. 
And where one party furnishes the capital and the 
other party the services in a business, and they agree 
to share the profits, but without any reference to 
losses, it may constitute a partnership. It has been 
held that a sharing of losses is not essential to a part-
nership. An agreement to share profits usually im-
plies an agreement to bear losses in the absence of a 
stipulation to the contrary, although the absence of 
an agreement to share losses is sometimes considered 
a circumstance against the existence of a partner-
ship. * * *" 
At page 141: 
"The Uniform Partnership Act provides that no 
prima facie inference of partnership shall be drawn if 
a share of the profits of a business was received as a 
debt by installments or otherwise. 
"Clauses (a) and (d) of subsection 7 ( 4) of the 
Uniform Partnership Act are similar in that they deal 
with a relation that may be either a debtor-creditor 
relation or one of partnership. However, (a) appears 
to relate to debts owing creditors where claims arose 
in the course of trade and who made arrangements 
with the financially embarrassed debtor to permit 
continuance of the business in an effort to secure pay-
ment; or, as stated in one case to ' * * *increase the 
amount recoverable on their claims'; while (d) ap-
pears to relate to loans made a partnership which 
might result more favorably than if intell"est were 
charged and which carry an element of risk. Historic-
ally this may have occurred as a device to escape the 
consequences of usury. The distinction is more clearly 
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brought out in the equivalent provisions of the Eng-
lish statute. Then too, these situations may exist in 
combination, the creditor first postponing his debt for 
a share of the profits and later making a loan or ad-
vance to the debtor." 
At page 142: 
"The sharing of profits is probably the only so-
called essential element of the partnership relation 
that is absolutely indispensable." 
At page 147: 
"As a general rule it is held that a partnership ex-
ists where persons share in the profits of an enter-
prise as profits and not as a measure of compensation 
for services, property or opportunity in aid of the 
business; or, otherwise stated, when they may be said 
to be the co-owners of the business. * * * " 
At age 168: 
"* * *It is not what the parties call their relation 
that determines but what they actually agree upon in 
their contract. It is the intent to do those things which 
constitute a partnership that should usually deter-
mine whether or not that relation exists between the 
parties." 
Point III could have merit only if the court should have 
found that a partnership existed. If the trial court's find-
ing in this regard is reversed and partnership found, the 
only remedy under law and the pleadings would be to 
declare a dissolution as of the date of Milton's death in 
1959 and order an accounting and winding up. In this case, 
the defendant partners' admitted taking of the partner-
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ship realty should be set aside and the property and its 
proceeds restored to the partnership. 
POINT IV 
ANY DOUBTS OR UNCERTAINTIES AS TO THE 
MEANING OR EFFECT OF EXHIBIT P-B MUST BE 
RESOLVED AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
The court found (R. 110) that the 1932 agreement was 
a document prepared by the attorney for the defendants, 
George and Milton, on their behalf and that plaintiffs had 
no part in the preparation or drafting of that agreement. 
Defendants and their predecessors were, then, the persons 
who prepared the contract under discussion. The court 
further found that said George and Milt occupied a posi-
tion of trust and confidence with relation to the plaintiffs, 
as has been previously discussed. The defendants other 
than George and the estate of Milton are assignees of a 
portion of their interests and would stand in the same 
shoes so far as this contract is concerned. 
The trial court found that, under the facts and condi-
tions as he understood and determined them, the 1932 
agreement was a valid and binding contract, but that it 
had a different meaning and effect than defendants con-
tended for. He held that the contract, despite its recitals 
and some of its wording, was not a contract under which 
plaintiffs sold their inheritance to defendants in 1932, but 
was, instead, a contract under which either plaintiffs or 
defendants could require a sale to be made at any time 
they chose, plaintiffs, individually or collectively, by de-
manding payment and defendants by proferring payment, 
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with the price to be determined by the fair market value 
of the interest at the time the demand for payment, or 
profer of payment was made. Necessarily this implies 
that, until the sale is thus effected, the parties continued 
to be co-owners. 
The rule of construction urged in this point appears to 
be admitted by defendants, who cite Maw v. Noble, 354 
P. 2d 121, 10 Ut. 2d 440, a case approving the rule. 
Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Com-
pany, 385 P. 2d 608, 14 Ut. 2d 414, a decision of this court 
handed down Dec. 11, 1963, states: 
" ( 1) Any doubts or uncertainties as to the mean-
ing or effect of the policy must be construed so as to 
resolve said doubts or uncertainties against the de-
fendant who prepared the contract." 
POINT V 
WHEN THERE IS ANY AMBIGUITY OR UNCER-
TAINTY IN A CONTRACT, THE CONSTRUCTION 
GIVEN BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES WILL BE 
FAVORED. 
The above rule is set forth in the following text and 
adopted as the law of the state of Utah in the following 
Utah cases: 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 623 
at page 789-790. 
"Sec. 623. Secondary Rules: An Interpretation 
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Given by the Parties Themselves Will be Favored. 
An important aid in the interpretation of contracts is 
the practical construction placed on the agreement 
by the parties themselves. The process of practical 
interpretation and application is a further indication 
by the parties of the meaning which they have placed 
upon the terms of the contract they have made. 
Courts give great weight to these expressions, be they 
acts or declarations. * *" 
Woodward v. Edmunds, 57 P. 848, 20 Utah 118. 
" * * *. If, however, there should be any doubt as to 
the interpretation which is thus placed upon the con-
tract under consideration, such doubt would seem to 
be removed by the acts and conduct of the parties 
themselves in relation thereto. The evidence clearly 
shows that from 1894, when the respondent first 
leased the herd, the sheep were, about the time of the 
expiration of each successive lease, counted out to the 
appellant, marked with his permanent mark, and 
then again delivered over to the lessee. They were 
constantly treated by the parties as the lessor's prop-
erty. Again they were so treated when, on August 25, 
1897, while the last lease was yet in force, the re-
spondent himself went to the appellant, and again 
sought to lease the same sheep which he then had in 
his possession, under the lease hereinbefore con-
strued, and actually signed an agreement which was 
then and there drawn up for another term, and con-
tained practically the same terms and conditions as 
the one which was about to expire although, owing to 
some disagreement between the parties, the instru-
ment was not executed by the appellant. Manifestly, 
by their acts and conduct, the parties to the instru-
ment construed it as one of bailment merely and 
~here there is any ambiguity in a contract, the' prac~ 
ttcal construction which the parties to the imstrument 
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have given it before any controversy arose between 
them should be adopted by the court. This court so 
held in Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 331, 40 Pac. 
206." (Emphasis added.) 
Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp. (Utah 1954), 266 P. 2d 
494, 1 u t. 2d 3'20. 
1. " * * *. It is fundamental that if effect can be given to 
both of two apparently conflicting provisions in a 
reasonable reconciliation that interpretation will 
control. Williston on Contracts, sec. 622." 
2. " * * *. Further, in the interpretation of contracts, the 
interpretation given by the parties themselves as 
shown by their acts will be adopted by the court. 3 
Williston on Contracts, sec. 623." (Emphasis added.) 
POINT VI 
THE 1932 AGREEMENT (EX. P-B) IS UNCERTAIN 
AND AMBIGUOUS, CONTAINS CONFLICTING PRO-
VISIONS AND IS NOT COMPLETE WITHIN ITS 
FOUR CORNERS. 
Defendants rely on Ex. P-B as being so clear, certain, 
understandable and unambiguous as not to permit re-
course to evidence outside its four corners as an aid to its 
construction. Plaintiffs submit that the contract is so un-
certain, ambiguous and incomplete that it can only be 
understood and interpreted by recourse to all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding its execution, and the 
conduct of the parties during the 28 years it was (accord-
ing to the trial court's finding) in full force and effect 
prior to this litigation. 
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The lack of certainty is apparent when one seeks the 
answer to the key questions significant to a contract of 
sale, a contract to sell, or a partnership agreement with 
buy-out provisions. Such questions are: 
1. What is the purchase price? 
2. When does title pass? 
3. How are profits to be determined? 
4. Does a share of profits include a share in unearned 
increment in asset values if the asset is sold during the 
period of profit splitting, and before payment of the pur-
chase price? If the asset is held? 
5. When must seller's share of the profits be paid him? 
May buyer hold those profits and use them? If buyer does 
hold part of seller's profits, must he pay seller interest for 
their use? 
Let us consult the disputed contract and see how cer-
tain it is in the above regards: 
1. What is the purchase price? Is it established with 
certainty? The contract says: 
"3. The present Salt Lake Transfer Company 
agrees, upon six months demand from the person so 
selling, to pay for each one-ninth so purchased one-
ninth of the sum found as the value of the GEORGE 
H. SIMS interest as per the Bill of Sale above men-
tioned." 
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How many dollars is that? Parol evidence is necessary to 
identify the Bill of Sale and show that it is the document 
referred to in the contract. Ex. P-B is obviously incom-
plete in and of itself on the matter of price. Does the 
purchase price become certain when Ex. P-A (the Bill of 
Sale) is located, identified, and admitted in evidence and 
considered in connection with Ex. P-B? It says: 
"In case any Grantee wishes to withdraw his or her 
interest in the partnership property, the value of the 
same shall be appraised by GLADYS S. BULLOUGH 
and GEORGE A. SIMS and the figure set by these 
two shall be binding upon the withdrawing Grantee." 
Does this add certainty? On its face it appears to defer 
valuation until one of the children "wishes to withdraw 
his or her interest," but doesn't say whether the wish 
must be subjective or expressed. It seems clear from the 
testimony that none of the plaintiffs ever wished to with-
draw, or thought they had done so. Certainly they didn't 
sign Ex. P-B because of any wish on their part. It was 
forced on them by George who said it must be signed if 
the business was to continue. The first time they even 
expressed a willingness to withdraw was in 1959 when 
some of them said they'd take $18,000 but George 
wouldn't pay it. 
May one "withdraw" without wishing to, by signing 
Ex. P-B? Does one "withdraw" before or after he ceases 
to share in the profits? The agreement, even aided by the 
Bill of Sale, furnishes no certain answer to these ques-
tions. 
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The contract, even aided by Ex. P-A, fails to tell us the 
time as of which the valuation is to be made. As of the 
time of the wish? As of the time of the withdrawal? Or, as 
of the time of the payment? How can a price be certain 
which is to be the result of a valuation to be made as of a 
date which is not clearly specified? The price cannot be 
determined from the 1932 agreement without outside 
help. 
Even if the time when the valuation was to be made 
were certain, the contract is uncertain and ambiguous as 
to the standard of evaluation. Is it to be the fair market 
value or the book value? Is it to be valued as a going 
business? Is the value to be a cash sales price or a time 
price? Or is the choice of the standard of evaluation to be 
at the free, unfettered, final and binding option of the two 
valuers? The document itself simply doesn't tell us. Either 
the answer must be presumed or postulated, or the court 
must consult extrinsic evidence as an aid. 
2. When does title pass? Paragraph 2 of the contract 
says "vendee, hereby purchases, and each of the vendors 
hereby sells and conveys all the latter's interest." Para-
graph 6 says "Each of the vendors covenant that no sale or 
transfer of the interest in the old partnership has been 
made by such vendor." 
Paragraph 6 clearly does not say "that no sale or trans-
fer of an interest in the old partnership has heretofore 
been made." The contract must be strongly construed 
against the scrivener and the inference drawn which is 
less favorable to defendants. 
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Referring again to the language of Ex. P-A, one could 
hardly suppose that a withdrawal has been made if no 
sale has been made. A contract to sell in the future could 
be held to be an agreement to withdraw in the future, and 
the trial court so held. It would be difficult to conclude 
that the trial court clearly erred in so doing. 
3. How are profits to be determined? Paragraph 5 of the 
contract includes the provision that "the partners of the 
present partnership shall be the sole judge of what is a 
capital investment." Are they also to be the sole judge of 
whether profits are to be determined by usual accounting 
methods, and whether the accounting standards of the 
Public Service Commission and Interstate Commerce 
Commission are "usual"? Reference to extrinsic rules of 
construction would seem to be required. 
Under the 1932 agreement, when a "capital investment" 
purchased out of what might otherwise have been 
"profits" is sold, do vendors share in the proceeds of the 
sale to the extent of the gain? Or only to the extent 
profits were diverted from vendors to purchase the capital 
asset? Or neither? The answer to this question determines 
plaintiffs' participation, or lack of it, in a fleet of rolling 
stock valued by the trial court (R. 369) at $175,000.00. 
The question is very material. Can the contract be said to 
be so complete and free from certainty in this regard as to 
require extrinsic evidence to be excluded and the trial 
court reversed? 
Each of the other questions runs into a similar vacuum 
when one seeks to pin the answer down with clarity and 
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certainty. It cannot even be told from the contract when 
plaintiffs are to receive their share of the profits. Is it to 
be on demand, or at stated intervals? Perhaps they are to 
be paid at "reasonable" intervals. If so, what is reasonable 
must be determined by evidence outside the contract. 
The trial court did not err in admitting extrinsic evi-
dence to clarify the 1932 agreement. It had to look to the 
conduct of the parties to supply enough answers to permit 
the contract to be enforced at all. The alternative to ad-
mitting extrinsic evidence, both written and parol, would 
have been to declare the contract so vague and incomplete 
as to be unenforceable. Since it is the trial court's duty 
under such circumstances to refer to extrinsic evidence 
when it is available, it cannot be said that the trial court 
erred by doing so. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE PURPORTED VALUATION MADE IN 1947 WAS 
NOT A VALUATION BINDING UNDER THE 1932 
AGREEMENT. 
Point VI of defendants' brief contends that the court 
erred in "ignoring the valuation set in 1947 by those desig-
nated in the 1932 bill of sale and agreement." Defendants 
assume the court ignored Ex. D-H, when in fact the court 
considered it carefully and, in light of all the facts and 
circumstances, found that it was not a valid and binding 
valuation. Finding No. 7 (R. 111) reads as follows: 
"There has never been a proper or binding valua-
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tion of plaintiffs' interests within the contemplation 
of said agreement or within the contemplation of the 
Bill of Sale (Exhibit "A" herein) by which plaintiffs 
obtained their interest in the Salt Lake Transfer 
Company." 
Plaintiffs are entitled to have the evidence viewed most 
favorably to them in determining if this finding is sus-
tained. The pertinent facts are these: 
It was not until June 30, 1960, that the time for valuing 
plaintiffs' share of the partnership arrived. This is the 
time that defendants exercised their right to buy plain-
tiffs' interest and offered payment of $8,579.40. Defend-
ants could have exercised their right any time in the 
preceding 28 years and thus fixed an earlier time of 
valuation but chose not to do so. The bill of sale says: 
"In case any Grantee wishes to withdraw his or her 
interest in the partnership property, the value of the 
same shall be appraised by GLADYS S. BULLOUGH 
and GEORGE A. SIMS and the figure set by these 
two shall be binding upon the withdrawing Grantee." 
There was no contract provision for valuation prior to 
withdrawal and particularly no authority for the valua-
tion claimed in 1947. The 1932 contract was, and was 
construed by the court to be, more a matter of fixing the 
terms for continuing the joint business of the parties than 
it was a withdrawal. There being no withdrawal until 
defendants exercised their rights to expel plaintiffs, that 
is, until 1960, no purported valuation at a different time 
would qualify under the Bill of Sale. Since the parties 
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hndn't made a 1960 valuation, the court proceeded to 
do so. 
Gladys S. Bullough never made a valuation at any time. 
The evidence is that her husband discussed the books and 
records with Grant Sims and his accountant, and that Ex. 
D-H was drawn up under Grant's direction and in accord 
with his partisan interpretation of the Bill of Sale and 
1932 agreement. Either D-H or D-I, and defendants never 
established which, was simply placed before Gladys at 
her home at 7: 30 a.m. one morning by George, who 
assured her when she demurred (R. 235-6) "It's perfectly 
all right, Sis. We have just got to do it for the records." 
Her testimony (R. 235) was that, although she did sign 
Ex. D-H, she did not participate in deriving the figures in 
the accounting, did not make an evaluation or have esti-
mates made, and did not check on the fair value of real 
estate or franchises. To hold that all six of the plaintiffs 
were bound by such a travesty of a valuation would be a 
gross injustice. 
The man who did participate in the preparation of Ex's. 
D-H and D-I, David H. Bullough, testified (R. 246) that 
he prepared them on the assumption that he was to try to 
find the April, 1932 worth of the Salt Lake Transfer Com-
pany and that that was what Ex's. D-H and D-I repre-
sented. The trial court held this to be a wrong legal theory 
and hence an invalid premise. 
The evidence amply sustains the trial court's conclu-
sions that the purported valuation of 1947, being based on 
an invalid premise and erroneous theory, having been 
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made by the wrong person (David instead of Gladys), 
having been made without estimates, valuations or ac-
counting, and having been made before any of plaintiffs 
withed to withdraw was not a proper or binding valuation 
of plaintiffs' interest. No other result could have been 
reached under the evidence. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT OF THE PARTIES TO 
REACH A SETTLEMENT IN 1959 WAS NOT A BIND-
ING VALUATION. 
In Point VII, as in Point VI, defendants assume that the 
trial court ignored evidence which it considered and 
weighed with the other evidence. Nothing about the 1959 
discussion between George and some unidentified persons, 
who included the plaintiff, Louis Sims, and Grant Mal-
quist, husband of one of the plaintiffs, recommends their 
proposed price as a va1uation. None of plaintiffs saw the 
books or had any idea of the state of the business. They 
simply said they would take $18,000 for their shares and 
not attempt any formal or complete valuation. George 
refused to pay it. To hold that a plaintiff cannot recover 
more than the lowest acceptable offer of compromise 
would introduce a new and dangerous concept to our law. 
The entire conversation is set forth at page 16 of this 
brief. Its primary significance is that it constitutes a rec-
ognition by the principal defendant that the plaintiffs 
were his co-owners and partners as late as 1959. 
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POINT IX 
ASSUMING A 1960 PURCHASE PRICE, THE COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
AS TO THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID PLAINTIFFS BY 
DEFENDANTS. 
Having concluded that the 1932 agreement was valid 
and enforceable, the court was faced with the problem of 
determining the price at which plaintiffs' interest in the 
Salt Lake Transfer Company had been sold to defendants 
at the June, 1960 date of sale. The trial court decided that 
each plaintiff was entitled to receive from defendants all 
undistributed portions of his share of the earnings, to-
gether with the value of his 6-2/3% share of the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company, including the real property previously 
diverted by defendants into Sims Realty, Inc., and its 
rents and profits. 
The trial court concluded, and adjudged, that the value 
of the Salt Lake Transfer Company was an amount not 
less than the fair market value of all of its parts. It con-
cluded that this was a fair and proper way to evaluate the 
proportional interests of the plaintiffs because it only re-
quired the defendants to pay the fair price of the things 
the defendants received and it gave to the plaintiffs, as the 
proceeds of their sale, the fair value of the things they 
transferred over. Since the sale from plaintiffs to defend-
ants had been accomplished without an intermediary real 
estate agent or salesman, no part of the purchase price 
had to be lost to either party as an expense of the sale 
between them. This seems an eminently fair and proper 
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way to approach the subject. 
Plaintiffs employed a certified public accountant skilled 
in transportation company accounting and had him de-
termine from the books and records of the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company what portion of the earnings plaintiffs 
should have received in the years 1932 to June, 1960 and 
deduct the amount actually paid. This result is set forth in 
Ex. P-16 and there seems to be no substantial conflict 
between the parties on this one point. 
The accountant then proceeded to determine from the 
books and records of the Salt Lake Transfer Company the 
book value of the company exclusive of certain items 
which could be expected to have a fair market value 
different from their book value. The items thus separated 
were the real estate (separately appraised as the value of 
Sims Realty, Inc. because it had been set aside by defend-
ants into Sims Realty), the rolling stock, certain invest-
ments having an undisputed value of $3,312.00 and the 
intangibles, consisting of the franchises, certificates and 
operating rights, all of which are regularly marketable. 
This procedure is the usual procedure followed in ascer-
taining the true market value of any business that in-
cludes among its assets items whose actual fair market 
value may be different, whether greater or smaller, than 
the book value. 
The accountant determined (Ex. P-16) that the book 
value of the Salt Lake Transfer Company exclusive of the 
real estate, rolling stock, investments and operating rights 
was a negative $34,017.09. This was not the subject of any 
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substantial dispute. The next problem was to determine 
the fair market value of the separately valued assets of 
the Salt Lake Transfer Company and witnesses were 
called for that purpose. 
Plaintiffs called the most eminent, experienced and 
capable truck appraiser in these Western United States to 
appraise the motorized equipment. Defendants called no 
independent expert at all, relying upon the testimony of 
the defendant, G. Grant Sims only. Plaintiffs called Ray 
Paramore, a ten-year veteran of the new and used heavy 
trailer sales business at Salt Lake City to appraise the 
trailers. Defendants called no independent expert, relying 
on the testimony of the defendant, Grant Sims, only. 
To establish the value of the franchises, certificates and 
operating rights, plaintiffs called two independent ex-
perts, Walt Utzinger, a man who had actually marketed a 
number of authorities similar to those of the Salt Lake 
Transfer Company, and Leonard D. Seifers, Vice-Presi-
dent and Assistant to the President of Interstate Motor 
Lines, Inc., one of the most efficient, experienced and 
capable operators in the motor truck industry, an expert 
on the marketing of franchises, certificates and operating 
rights. Both of these witnesses were wholly impartial, 
having no interest whatever in the outcome of the litiga-
tion. The defendants relied solely on the testimony of the 
defendants, Grant Sims and Elmer Sims. 
Defendants called a young assistant professor from the 
University of Utah named Frank K. Stuart who was 
serving on the faculty at the University at the same time 
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he was in the process of writing his thesis looking toward 
obtaining his Ph.D. degree. Mr. Stuart testified that he 
based his estimate of value solely upon the earnings of the 
company. He stated, when asked whether he had made an 
examination of the Salt Lake Transfer Company, that, 
he "would not really call it an examination, it wasn't a 
detailed examination" (R. 631). He further stated that he 
had not verified such things as whether the company 
operated on its own real property or that of others (R. 
631), and that he didn't know whether the company had 
any franchises or operating rights. In the latter regard his 
testimony is as follows (R. 647): 
"A (Mr. Stuart)*** I don't know what their rights 
are- where they have to go. I don't even know 
whether they have rights or not to deliver to Clear-
field. 
Q And even though you don't know whether they 
have rights or not, and even though you don't know 
whether they have land or not, you would still feel 
that $135,000.00 is a fair valuation for this company, 
is that right? 
A As a going concern." 
His testimony is fairly summed up by the following 
question and answer (R. 635): 
"Q (Mr. Tanner) ***For example, your evalua-
tion of this company at $135,000.00 is made quite 
irrespective of whether or not the company's assets 
include $150,000.00, $200,000.00 or $50,000.00 cash in 
addition to the real estate, is it not? 
A The assets are only as valuable as what they 
can produce." 
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In summary, Mr. Stuart did not contest the valuation of 
any of the assets evaluated by plaintiffs' independent 
expert witnesses, contending only that, irrespective of the 
fair market value of any of its component assets, no 
company is worth any more than its average earnings 
multiplied by a given multiple, and that $135,000.00 was 
the figure he got when he picked certain years, averaged 
the income and multiplied it out. The trial court con-
cluded that this approach was not the proper approach 
for determining the sales price between plaintiffs and 
defendants and so adjudged in the first trial (R. 114-5). 
The trial court found against Mr. Stuart's testimony, ap-
parently concluding that it had no probative value in this 
case, being unsound in both concept and execution. 
Of overriding significance is the fact that defendants 
failed to call a single independent expert witness as to the 
value of the real estate, the rolling stock or the franchises. 
From their failure to call a real estate appraiser to 
challenge the appraisal of plaintiffs' experts, Edmund D. 
Cook, M.A. I. and Augustus B. C. Johns, M.A.I., S.R.A., one 
can only infer that the real estate appraisers known to 
and presumably consulted by defendants and by defend-
ants' capable and experienced counsel all came up with an 
appraised value for the real estate which was equal to or 
in excess of that claimed by plaintiffs' witnesses. Plain-
tiffs' appraisal (Ex. D-2) is full, detailed and complete. It 
was in the hands of defendants and their counsel for the 
whole of the six-day trial and could readily be read, 
analyzed, and evaluated by any of the many other profes-
sional real estate appraisers of this cQmmunity. It would 
be unreasonable to assume that defendants and their at-
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torneys were so negligent as to fail to consult a real estate 
appraiser. 
It is equally significant that defendants called no inde-
pendent witnesses as to the fair market value of the 
motorized rolling stock or the trailers, even though they 
had available to them in this community all of the usual 
purveyors of new and used equipment, and even though 
defendants are, as to most such persons, old and valued 
customers. It is reasonable to assume from this that the 
independent appraisers arrived at values in excess of 
those shown by plaintiffs' witnesses. It is not reasonable 
to assume that defendants' capable and experienced at-
torneys were so slovenly in the discharge of their duties 
that they failed to consult the purveyors of equipment so 
readily available to them. 
Again it is significant that defendants, whose counsel 
appear before this court regularly as the representatives 
of many outstanding transportation companies, failed to 
call a single independent expert to challenge the ap-
praisals of Mr. Utzinger and Mr. Seifers regarding the 
value of the franchises, certificates and operating rights of 
the Salt Lake Transfer Company. Defendants have been 
engaged in the transportation industry for many decades. 
If, as the court may assume, defendants and their counsel 
consulted independent appraisers regarding the evalua-
tion of the said franchises, certificates and operating 
rights, it may be supposed that they would have called 
some of their friends or acquaintances to challenge the 
appraisal of plaintiffs' experts, were it not for the fact 
that their consultations with other experts resulted in 
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appraisals by those experts which were equal to or in 
excess of those of plaintiffs' witnesses. 
Plaintiffs' only quarrel with the findings of the trial 
court as to the value of the separately valued assets of the 
Salt Lake Transfer Company and of the real estate of the 
parties is that, in each instance, the court determined the 
value to be very substantially lower than the value set by 
the independent expert appraisers. Despite this objection, 
plaintiffs deem that they are bound by a determination of 
fact made by the trier of the fact when there is any com-
petent evidence in the record to sustain it. Plaintiffs 
believe and urge that this same rule applies with equal 
force to defendants. There is an abundance of evidence to 
support the valuations made by the trial court, and there 
is an abundance of evidence which would support a very 
substantially higher valuation in regard to each disputed 
item. 
A comparison between the testimony of plaintiffs' ex-
pert witnesses as to value and the trial court's finding in 
that regard is as follows: 
1. Real Estate owned by Sims Realty: 
Plaintiffs' witnesses (Ex. D-2) 
Court's finding (R. 368) 
Difference 
2. Rolling stock: 
Plaintiffs' witnesses (Exs. P-1 and P-4) 
Court's finding (R. 369) 
Difference 
$152,000 
105,000 
$ 47,000 
$254,450 
175,000 
$ 79,450 
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3. Franchises, certificates and operating rights: 
Plaintiffs' witnesses (not less than 
$255,000 nor more than $365,000) 
$255,000 - 365,000 
Court's finding (R. 369) 150,000 - 150,000 
Difference $105,000 - 215,000 
A more complete and detailed memorandum regarding 
values and valuations is found in the record on appeal 
(R. 331 to 344 incl.). The court's particular attention is 
invited to said memorandum and to Ex. P-16. The fact 
analyses and details included in said memorandum are 
not reproduced in this brief in full because the briefs of 
counsel herein are already very long and plaintiffs want 
to avoid any unnecessary enlargement of them. 
Defendants have devoted a very substantial portion of 
the argument under Point VIII of their brief to the prop-
osition that the better evidence as to value is that given by 
their witnesses or that arrived at by counsel's own un-
supported analysis of the appraisal report of plaintiffs' 
real estate appraisers. Plaintiffs submit that defendants 
are not entitled to a reversal of the trial court's findings of 
fact simply because they prefer the valuation of their own 
witnesses. They are entitled to reversal only when the 
record is without credible evidence to support the trial 
court's findings of fact. In this instance, the best evidence 
sustains the trial court's findings and there is ample evi-
dence which could (and in plaintiffs' opinion should) 
sustain a far larger judgment than that rendered. 
In their zeal, defendants have made statements in their 
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brief which are grave distortions of the state of the 
record. An example, by no means the only one, is the 
following statement on page 70 of appellants' brief re-
garding John Sims' compromise with George Sims: 
"••• This was an arms-length transaction arrived 
at by a knowledgable and discriminating seller with 
a knowledgable and discriminating buyer, where 
neither was under any compulsion to complete the 
transaction. John Sims was no neophyte in the busi-
ness world. The evidence is that he was a successful 
automobile dealer in San Bernardino, * * * ." 
The only evidence on this subject is the testimony of 
Grant Sims (R. 760) and George Sims (R. 769) as follows: 
"Q What business is he (John) in? 
A (Grant Sims) He sells trucks and automobiles 
in San Bernardino, California. 
Q Do you mean just as a salesman? 
A He is the owner of an agency, but he possibly 
rtells. 
Q An experienced businessman? 
A Of many years. 
Q Experienced in the buying and selling of motor 
~ehicles? 
A That is true." 
·'THE WITNESS (George Sims) : John asked me if 
I would buy his interest. I said: 'Well, John, how 
much do you want for it?' And he said: 'I will take 
ten thousand dollars.' He was talking about being 
hard up and needed money, and I said: 'John, I will 
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give you ten thousand dollars.' And I wrote out a 
check***." 
The disparity between the record and the brief is glar-
ingly self evident. 
Defendants urge that the trial court used a salvage 
value basis in arriving at its findings and judgment and 
that salvage value cannot be rightfully ascertained unless 
you determine the liquidation or salvage expense. By 
analogy to debating terms, defendants first set up a straw 
man and then destroy it. · 
In the first place, there is nothing in the record to indi-
cate that the court used a salvage value basis for its 
evaluation and, in the second place, there is nothing about 
the contract between the parties to indicate that they 
intended any sales commissions or sales expenses to be 
deducted from the purchase price, since no such expense 
was to be incurred. It should be noted that if defendants 
are actually concerned that they are overcharged in the 
trial court's determination of value, they need only agree 
to an accounting and winding up. In that event all costs of 
sale and sales commissions would in fact be deducted 
before the balance is distributed among the partners ac-
cording to their ownership. Their unwillingness to do this 
could evidence a belief that the damages here awarded 
are: as plaintiffs have contended, very substantially less 
than the actual worth of plaintiffs' interests in the com-
pany. 
There would be no more justification for requiring the 
amounts to be paid by defendants to plaintiffs for their 
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interest in the Salt Lake Transfer Company to be reduced 
by a theoretical cost of sale or sales commission than 
there would be for inserting a sales commission in an 
action between the vendor of real estate and vendee of 
real estate where no sales agent was involved, and de-
ducting this theoretical, unincurred cost from the sales 
price set in the real estate contract. There was no commis-
sion incurred in the sale from plaintiffs to defendants, no 
commission is anticipated in future, and the only evidence 
is that defendants propose to continue to operate the 
business they have thus purchased and not to incur a sales 
commission. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's interpretation of the contract between 
plaintiffs and defendants is amply justified by the terms 
of that contract, the facts and circumstances surrounding 
its execution and the conduct of the parties in the years 
since it was made. Plaintiffs' only complaint is that the 
trial court should have, under the evidence and the ap-
plicable rules of law, found the 1932 agreement to have 
been void and further found the status of the parties in 
relation to one another to have been that of partners, with 
the partnership dissolved by the death of Milton K. Sims 
in 1959. The amount of damages found by the trial court 
are abundantly supported by the evidence, and the evi-
dence would have supported damages in a far greater 
sum. 
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs respectfully urge 
the court either to affirm the judgment of the trial court, 
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or, if that judgment is to be varied on appeal, to hold that 
the 1932 agreement between the parties is vod and unen-
forceable and that the relationship of the parties during 
the intervening years has been that of partnership, and to 
order an accounting by defendants of the partnership's 
conduct and assets, including the real property diverted 
to Sims Realty Company, and a winding up of the 
business. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEROL & GEERNAERT and 
EARL D. TANNER 
By EARL D. TANNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
and Cross Appellants 
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